Besides the decision to start De’Anthony Melton at the two-guard next to Stephen Curry, there are two notable standouts in the box score of the Golden State Warriors’ 127-116 win over the Oklahoma City Thunder: Trayce Jackson-Davis, who started the game at the five, saw only 4 minutes and 43 seconds of action; Kevon Looney, his veteran backup, didn’t see the floor at all. A key aspect of this deep Warriors roster has been adaptability, and Steve Kerr deemed it wise to adapt to what the situation against the Thunder called for.

That situation may have been born out of one particular sequence in the first quarter. Jackson-Davis had been taken out after a so-so start in which the Warriors were outscored by six points in his 4 minutes and 43 seconds of playing time. Kerr opted for the small option by slotting Draymond Green into the five against what was, at the time, a relatively big Thunder lineup consisting of 7’1” Chet Holmgren at the five. Kerr, therefore, was banking on a speedy lineup capable of getting stops, running the floor, and scoring against a non-set Thunder defense.

However, it was on this possession below — against a set Thunder defense — that may have had a significant impact on both teams’ choice to go mano-a-mano with their small lineups:

Any time an offense can create “double gaps” in the half court, it makes opponents lives much more difficult. “Double gaps” are simply defined as a situation in which two offensive players are two passes away from each other — usually separated by an empty spot on the floor, such an empty slot, empty wing, or empty corner.

In the Warriors’ case above, the double gap is present in the form of an open wing between Gary Payton II on the slot and Andrew Wiggins in the corner:

This isolates Shai Gilgeous-Alexander as the lone man virtually defending two offensive players on the weak side. When Melton finds Payton, Jalen Williams rotates toward Payton, who then swings the ball to Wiggins in the corner. Gilgeous-Alexander closes out and is baited up in the air with the fake. Wiggins decides to attack the close-out and challenge Holmgren — second among qualified players in terms of opponent field goal percentage at the rim (41.5%), with Victor Wembanyama (35.7%) the only one besting him. Wiggins goes hard at Holmgren, does the right thing by getting a body on the rim protector, and manages to get the ball in the hoop — and causing Holmgren to fall hard to the floor in the process, which would take him out of the game.

With no Isaiah Hartenstein, the Thunder’s center depth was decimated, forcing them to fight small with small — which wasn’t a bad idea at all, given the balance of offensive firepower coupled with defensive versatility they could throw out with their corps of guards and wings that have a height range of 6’3” to 6’6”. They could space the floor and continuously pound opponents with their drive and kick game, fueled by the shot-creation punch provided by Gilgeous-Alexander and Williams — all while being able to keep opponents’ half-court offense flat and contained with help from the likes of Luguentz Dort and Alex Caruso, with the ability to switch near endlessly.

However, the Warriors themselves were no strangers to playing small, for they were the progenitors of this current version of the Thunder’s small lineup. As such, once Kerr realized that Holmgren wasn’t going back in any time soon, he decided to challenge the Thunder’s new-age small ball with his tried and tested formula of small ball.

With Melton, Payton, Wiggins, Green on the floor at the same time, the Warriors could count on a cocktail of switchability, roaming mobility, length, athleticism, and peskiness at the point of attack. The speed across the board in terms of close-outs and scrambles were also better, allowing the unit to force stops and get back on the other end. Even if the Thunder managed to get back to set their defense, there’s enough spacing — in the form of Melton on the floor — to punish even the slightest mistakes.

But the ultimate reason why these small lineups work is the two-way one-two punch that is Curry and Green. The latter’s ability to wear multiple hats on defense, defend multiple player profiles, and play multiple coverages on an above-average level provides Kerr a level of luxury unheard of (and impossible to replicate by anyone else) since Green was unleashed as a full-time starter a decade ago.

Curry’s value in small-ball lineups doesn’t need to be explained. Rather, the proof is in the extensive years’ worth of film — including the footage he put on record against the Thunder this time around. Consider when Curry was on a tear in the third quarter, during which he scored 17 of his 36 points. Curry is perhaps the best at exploiting the multiple ways through which defenders try to nullify his effectiveness around screens, especially when they “top-lock” (deny) him from using them.

When Dort employs top-locking against Curry in split action, note how Curry sneakily positions himself in such a manner that Dort ends up on Curry’s high side — which allows him to cut toward the rim. With no Holmgren to protect the paint, Curry sees an open lane to lay the ball in:

Also consider ball-screen and ball-screen-adjacent actions for Curry, which the Thunder also initially switched. Several possessions of rookie Dillon Jones guarding Curry in isolation assured that the risk of keeping the Warriors offense flat was giving Curry a favorable matchup to feast on:

This fed into the Thunder’s eventual hesitation to leave one defender guarding Curry by his lonesome. As the game progressed toward the fourth quarter and the Thunder came perilously close to rallying from what was once a 30-point deficit, they increasingly sent additional eyes and bodies Curry’s way.

On this guard-guard away screen action involving Curry and Hield, for example, a switch is involved — but Dort elects to leave Hield alone to show backline help against Curry, creating another favorable situation on the weak side for Melton, working with a spaced floor with Hield next to him one pass away:

Such a “soft” double was combined with outright two-to-the-ball commitments toward Curry on ball screens. In lieu of Green as the short-roll release valve, Kyle Anderson proved to be his capable doppelganger — complete with a floater that has consistently ranked in the above-average percentile for his position:

Another double on Curry in the next possession creates another double gap on the weak side:

Which is a tough endeavor for an isolated defender splitting the difference between two capable shooters:

The next time around, another double gap is created from another double-team commitment — this time, with the gap created involving an empty corner situated between the dunker spot and the wing:

The Warriors, with their offensive fulcrum and small lineups that have a reasonable amount of spacing, have historically feasted on opponents who try to play along with their small-ball tendencies:

A huge part of which has been the creation of double gaps to punish double teams on Curry, isolating defenders on the weak side, and creating a huge double-digit lead against the Thunder, providing them a large cushion to fend off the rally that came soon after.